During the early and intermediate phases of a nuclear or radiological incident, the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) collects environmental samples that are analyzed by organizations with radioanalytical capability. Resources dedicated to quality assurance (QA) activities must be sufficient to assure that appropriate radioanalytical measurement quality objectives (MQOs) and assessment data quality objectives (DQOs) are met. As the emergency stabilizes, QA activities will evolve commensurate with the need to reach appropriate DQOs. The MQOs represent a compromise between precise analytical determinations and the timeliness necessary for emergency response activities. Minimum detectable concentration (MDC), lower limit of detection, and critical level tests can all serve as measurements reflecting the MQOs. The relationship among protective action guides (PAGs), derived response levels (DRLs), and laboratory detection limits is described. The rationale used to determine the appropriate laboratory detection limit is described.
Introduction
The initial federal response for a nuclear/radiological incident is from the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) regionally-based Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), Emergency Management Teams, and Nuclear Incident Response Team Assets. These teams communicate incident information to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) and the Sandia National Laboratories High Consequence Assessment and Technology Department. These organizations have tools that are used to characterize the airborne source material and simulate atmospheric dispersion and surface deposition. Deposition and dispersion models are needed to predict dose to humans from airborne or ground contamination through several pathways (air immersion exposure, ground exposure, inhalation, and ingestion). Modeling results are typically plotted as maps of areas corresponding to a range of air or ground contamination levels that might be encountered by field monitoring teams, and for areas where the predicted (modeled) dose exceeds PAGs.
As appropriate, the DOE's Aerial Measuring System (AMS), which is an aerial radiological surveillance capability, is deployed. The AMS uses two platforms: a fixed-wing aircraft for rapid response to measure areas of relatively high concentrations of higher energy gamma-emitting radionuclides, and a helicopter for higher spatial resolution of lower concentrations with the capability of detecting lower-energy gamma emitters. The AMS fixed-wing aircraft objective is to provide decision makers with an overview of the radiological impact as quickly as possible. The data from the AMS aircraft are usually the first comprehensive set of measurements and are used by the * E-mail: nielsenec@nv.doe.gov modelers to normalize and refine their predictions and by decision makers for response actions. The AMS data may cover the area from several kilometers upwind of the release location to the farthest downwind extent of the deposition. The width of the area flown will depend on the modeled deposition pattern.
Modeling can help identify the most likely areas of concern for the responders. However, it is vitally important that aerial surveys and ground-truth measurements be taken as soon as practical after the event to allow the refinement of such models and to start the development of data maps that truly identify the hazards and issues as they are in the field. The primary goal is to replace the early model-based predictions, used to project initial protective actions, with actual monitoring results.
Initial monitoring activities will focus on protecting the public and responders. One of the first sampling priorities is establishing a defendable resuspension factor. This will require collecting air particulate samples; conducting alpha-, beta-, and gamma-radiation surveys; and performing an in situ gamma-spectrum collection and analysis. A soil sample is also collected at this site for later analysis to further quantify resuspension levels. Field teams are also equipped with tools for a variety of sampling activities to allow them to collect multiple environmental samples such as soil, water, milk, vegetation, foliage, etc., for definitive radioanalyses to confirm the initial field measurements.
Instrument surveys are conducted when a sample is collected. These surveys will help determine the presence or absence of a plume and field radiation levels.
During the early phase, there is little capacity for analytical radiochemistry and decisions will be made based on predictive dispersion models supplemented with field radiation measurements. The analytical response during this phase will be limited to field instrumentation, mobile laboratories, and local analytical capability. A database of radioanalytical organizations' capability, capacity, and competence indicators (Radioanalytical Organization Database for Emergency Operations - [RODEO] ) is available to the FRMAC laboratory supervisor. During the initial phase of the incident, the quantity of analytical data needed for assessment quickly increases. The DQOs are adjusted to be commensurate with the urgency of the decision at hand and the risk of potential consequences from an incorrect decision.
Assessment commences as soon as information begins to arrive. The focus is on performing assessments that will provide guidance for decision makers regarding what areas may warrant evacuation and/or whether citizens can be sheltered-in-place to avoid doses greater than the PAGs. Initial predictions and projections will be made using available knowledge and experience to determine early bounding assumptions. The initial NARAC model will provide a prediction of what areas are most affected and where to begin sheltering, evacuation, and initial data-gathering efforts.
As more field data becomes available, including the AMS flyover data, the amount of radioactive material released can reasonably be estimated. The modeled plume is then fitted to field measurements to provide the first reasonable view of the overall extent of the impacted areas so that accurate assessments of the expected radiation dose can be made. This information is plotted on a map showing areas where the potential dose may exceed the PAG without implementation of protective actions. As more data becomes available, the plume model inputs are further refined to adjust the plume model to properly match the results being observed in the field.
The next important action for the assessment scientist is to determine the relative concentrations and identification of the radionuclides released. This source term information is very important because it has significant impact on the dose assessment calculations. Different methods can be used to obtain this information depending upon the type of release. For a nuclear weapon accident, nuclear detonation, or nuclear reactor release, the expected radionuclide mixture can reasonably be determined from process knowledge based on the material released. However, for a radiological dispersal device (RDD), it is much more difficult to determine the radionuclides involved and their relative abundance. If there is any intelligence information related to the release, that information can also be used. However, until appropriate laboratory analysis is performed, the assessment scientists cannot be sure of the identity of all of the radionuclides involved in an RDD event.
Early in the event, all information available, as well as the experience of personnel, will be used to make initial predictions. As more data becomes available, this prediction will be advanced, allowing refinement of plume predictions, which ultimately bounds the predicted areas where PAGs may be exceeded. During this phase, geographical information system (GIS) maps can be created and reproduced every few hours. Changes to the plume model can occur with each iteration as better and more precise measurement information becomes available.
As initial samples are submitted to radioanalytical laboratories, the nuclides of interest and MQOs must be communicated to laboratory personnel.
DQOs for assessment
In addition to the response structure, the federal government, through the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), has established PAGs for the public and the environment. These PAGs were published in the EPA Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents. 7 This document divides the response to a nuclear incident into three phases, each with its own set of PAGs. These are termed the early, intermediate, and late phases. These phases cannot be represented by specific time periods since events vary greatly in magnitude and phases may overlap due to the transition of activities. These guidelines are used by the FRMAC in developing data products and by the Advisory Team in providing protective action recommendations to state and local decision makers (Table 1) . It is important to note that any support provided by the federal government in these areas is at the request of state and local authorities. 
